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Marking two years after that mass murder of the events of October 7th, an event that deeply affected global Jewish populations like no other occurrence following the establishment of the Jewish state.

For Jews it was profoundly disturbing. For the Israeli government, it was deeply humiliating. The entire Zionist movement had been established on the presumption which held that the Jewish state could stop things like this occurring in the future.

A response seemed necessary. But the response undertaken by Israel – the widespread destruction of the Gaza Strip, the deaths and injuries of many thousands of civilians – constituted a specific policy. This particular approach complicated the perspective of many Jewish Americans grappled with the initial assault that set it in motion, and currently challenges the community's commemoration of the anniversary. How can someone honor and reflect on an atrocity affecting their nation while simultaneously devastation experienced by another people in your name?

The Complexity of Remembrance

The difficulty surrounding remembrance stems from the reality that little unity prevails about the significance of these events. In fact, for the American Jewish community, the recent twenty-four months have seen the collapse of a fifty-year agreement on Zionism itself.

The early development of a Zionist consensus within US Jewish communities can be traced to a 1915 essay authored by an attorney who would later become Supreme Court judge Louis D. Brandeis called “The Jewish Problem; Finding Solutions”. However, the agreement truly solidified subsequent to the six-day war during 1967. Previously, US Jewish communities contained a vulnerable but enduring parallel existence between groups that had a range of views about the need for a Jewish nation – Zionists, neutral parties and opponents.

Previous Developments

This parallel existence persisted during the post-war decades, in remnants of socialist Jewish movements, through the non-aligned Jewish communal organization, among the opposing Jewish organization and comparable entities. In the view of Louis Finkelstein, the head of the theological institution, Zionism was more spiritual rather than political, and he did not permit the singing of the Israeli national anthem, Hatikvah, at religious school events in those years. Nor were Zionism and pro-Israelism the main element for contemporary Orthodox communities before the 1967 conflict. Different Jewish identity models remained present.

But after Israel defeated its neighbors in that war in 1967, occupying territories comprising the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Jerusalem's eastern sector, the American Jewish relationship to the country underwent significant transformation. The triumphant outcome, along with longstanding fears about another genocide, led to an increasing conviction in the country’s critical importance for Jewish communities, and a source of pride regarding its endurance. Discourse about the remarkable nature of the victory and the freeing of territory assigned Zionism a theological, almost redemptive, importance. During that enthusiastic period, much of the remaining ambivalence regarding Zionism dissipated. During the seventies, Commentary magazine editor Norman Podhoretz declared: “Everyone supports Zionism today.”

The Agreement and Its Limits

The pro-Israel agreement left out strictly Orthodox communities – who typically thought Israel should only be established via conventional understanding of redemption – however joined Reform, Conservative Judaism, Modern Orthodox and most non-affiliated Jews. The common interpretation of the consensus, what became known as progressive Zionism, was based on the idea about the nation as a democratic and liberal – though Jewish-centered – nation. Numerous US Jews considered the control of Palestinian, Syrian and Egypt's territories post-1967 as not permanent, assuming that a solution would soon emerge that would maintain Jewish population majority in pre-1967 Israel and regional acceptance of Israel.

Two generations of Jewish Americans grew up with pro-Israel ideology a core part of their religious identity. Israel became a central part within religious instruction. Israel’s Independence Day became a Jewish holiday. Blue and white banners were displayed in religious institutions. Seasonal activities became infused with Hebrew music and the study of the language, with visitors from Israel and teaching US young people Israeli customs. Travel to Israel expanded and reached new heights with Birthright Israel by 1999, providing no-cost visits to the country became available to Jewish young adults. The state affected virtually all areas of the American Jewish experience.

Evolving Situation

Paradoxically, during this period following the war, American Jewry developed expertise regarding denominational coexistence. Open-mindedness and communication between Jewish denominations expanded.

However regarding support for Israel – that represented pluralism ended. One could identify as a conservative supporter or a leftwing Zionist, but support for Israel as a Jewish homeland was assumed, and questioning that narrative placed you outside mainstream views – outside the community, as a Jewish periodical termed it in an essay recently.

But now, under the weight of the destruction in Gaza, food shortages, child casualties and frustration about the rejection of many fellow Jews who avoid admitting their involvement, that consensus has disintegrated. The liberal Zionist “center” {has lost|no longer